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WHEREAS, the [Florida] Legislature finds that there is a finan-
cial crisis in the workers' compensation insurance industry, causing
severe economic problems for Florida's business community and
adversely impacting Florida's ability to attract new business devel-
opment to the state. .. .1
I. INTRODUCTION
Given the above statement, it is little wonder that the Florida Leg-
islature set out to enact a comprehensive change in the workers' com-
pensation law in this state. Actually, the groundswell for change had
been building in the late 1980s, particularly from various business
groups which claimed that workers' compensation insurance coverage
for their employees was becoming extremely cost prohibitive. The pro-
position that escalating workers' compensation costs were a problem
was supported by various sources referred to by the Legislature. For
example, the Florida Economic Growth and International Development
Commission, created in 1988, concluded that Florida's reputation as a
high cost workers' compensation state inhibited economic growth.2
Also, the Florida Chamber of Commerce published a report concluding
that workers' compensation costs were a significant negative factor on
the state's business climate and urged reforms in the worker's compen-
sation laws which had placed Florida in a competitive disadvantage vis-
a-vis other states.' Additionally, a joint legislative committee found
that Florida had experienced one of the highest five-year period pre-
mium increases in the country for workers' compensation insurance. In-
surance rates were fifty-four percent higher than the national average,
and seventy-five percent higher than other southeastern states." This
same legislative report also focused on the medical and indemnity bene-
fits paid to employees under Florida's workers' compensation law and
concluded those benefits were substantially higher than the national av-
erage.' Specifically, medical benefits were forty-two percent higher in
Florida than the national average and thirty-eight percent higher than
1. Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894,
899 (codified as amended at FLA. STAT. § 440 (Supp. 1990)).
2. Id. at 897-98.
3. Id. at 898.
4. Id. at 899.
5. Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, 1990 Fla. Laws 894,
899 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440 (Supp. 1990)).
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the southern state average.6 Likewise, indemnity benefits were thirty-
one percent higher than the national average and sixty percent higher
than the southern state average.7
Legislative reform actually began in 1989 with several significant
changes in the existing law.8 Some of these changes included: the im-
plementation of a work place drug testing policy;8 a requirement that
all construction industry employers having one or more employees
carry workers' compensation coverage; 10 and, changing the threshold
for wage loss benefits to include not just a permanent impairment rat-
ing, but also the need for a work-related physical restriction." Further-
more, bad faith was eliminated and replaced with a modified twenty-
one day rule for establishing entitlement of an attorney's fee by the
injured worker's attorney to be paid by the employer/carrier. 12 Consid-
erable case law has developed since the adoption of the bad faith stan-
dard in 1989, and even technical omissions or commissions of an em-
ployer/carrier were found to constitute bad faith. Thus, finding bad
faith combined with a demonstrated economic loss to the injured
worker provided the basis for an award of attorney's fees to the injured
worker's attorney which was to be paid by the employer/carrier.' 3
Case decisions pointed out that the workers' compensation system
was intended to be self-executing and carriers had an affirmative duty
to timely investigate and provide needed benefits to injured workers."
Rehabilitation services under section 440.49 of the Florida Statutes
were also eliminated and replaced with something called training and
education.' 5 While the rehabilitation services necessary to restore the
injured worker to suitable gainful employment had previously been the
responsibility of the employer/carrier, training and education was to be
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. See FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(e)2 (1989).
9. Ft.A. STAT. § 440.09(6)(a) (1989).
10. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(14)(b)2 (1989).
11. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)1 (1989).
12. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3)(b) (1989).
13. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(3)(b) (1987).
14. King Motor Co. v. Parisi, 445 So. 2d 1074, 1075 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1984); Holiday Care Center v. Scriven, 418 So. 2d 322, 326 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982); Florida Erection Serv., Inc. v. McDonald, 395 So. 2d 203, 209 (Fla. 1st Dist.
Ct. App. 1981).
15. See Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, sec. 40, 1990
Fla. Laws 894, 980 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.49 (Supp. 1990)).
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provided by the Division of Workers' Compensation, unless voluntarily
offered by the employer or carrier.16
II. THE COMPREHENSIVE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ACT OF
1990
The new Comprehensive Economic Development Act of 1990 (the
Act), affected the entire workers' compensation system including the
amount of benefits payable, various medical provisions, and appellate
procedure. The following is a summary of the major changes made by
the Legislature in 1990.
A. Definitions
In response to a growing concern for the increase in claims for
stress-related injuries in the work place, the definition of "accident"
was amended.1 7 Specifically, "[a] mental or nervous injury due to
stress, fright or excitement only. . .[is] deemed not to be an injury by
accident arising out of the employment."1 8 The definition of "em-
ployee" was broadened to include partners, sole proprietors, 19 and cor-
porate officers of companies actively engaged in the construction indus-
try.20 This further tightened the coverage requirements which were
initially directed at the construction industry in 1989.21 Prior to that,
the term "employment" included all private employments in which
three or more employees were employed by the same employer. How-
ever, effective October 1, 1989, an exception to this general rule was
carved out for the construction industry providing that all construction-
related private employments having one or more employees, who were
employed by the same employer, were included under the employment
definition. 22 The 1990 law also provided that the term "employee" ex-
cluded an independent contractor not subject to the control and direc-
tion of the employer as to actual conduct. 23 However, the term "em-
ployee" was also amended to include the construction industry worker
16. Id.
17. See FLA. STAT. § 440.02(1) (Supp. 1990).
18. Id.
19. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.02(13)(c), (d)(4) (Supp. 1990).
20. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13)(d)4 (Supp. 1990).
21. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(14)(b)(2) (1989).
22. Id.
23. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(13)(d)1 (Supp. 1990).
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who was otherwise an independent contractor. 4
The definition of "wages" was revised to eliminate many fringe
benefits included in the average weekly wage calculation (AWW).15
Previously, a substantial body of case law developed regarding what
constituted fringe benefits. 6 In practice, the failure of the employer/
carrier to include fringe benefits was often based on a fair market re-
placement basis. Thereafter, the reasonable value of fringe benefits was
defined as the actual cost to the employer. Effective July 1, 1990, the
only fringe benefits to be included in the AWW are health insurance,
the reasonable value of permanent year-round residential housing pro-
vided to an employee, and housing for migrant workers unless provided
after the time of injury.27 This amendment eliminated a multitude of
previously defined fringe benefits from the AWW calculation including
life, disability and accident insurance,2 8 uniforms, 9 vacation,30 vested
pension plans,"1 parking,32 and meals.3
Two other major changes in the wages definition involve gratuities
and concurrent employment. In practice, claims of many service-ori-
ented employees, such as bartenders and waitresses, commonly involve
litigation over the amount of tips to be included in the AWW calcula-
tion. Employers would "look the other way" when their service person-
nel (who are usually paid a minimum hourly wage) under-reported
tips, but would vigorously protest when those same employees-when
injured on the job-sought workers' compensation benefits based on the
full amount of tips earned. Inclusion of tips obviously could make a
significant difference in an employee's compensation benefits. The In-
dustrial Relations Commission, and later Florida's First District Court
of Appeal, have indicated disapproval of an employer's indifference to
24. Id.
25. See Comprehensive Economic Dev. Act of 1990, ch. 90-201, sec. 9, 1990 Fla.
Laws 894, 908 (codified at FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990)).
26. See infra notes 28-33 and accompanying text.
27. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990).
28. Mobley v. Winter Park Memorial Hosp., 471 So. 2d 591, 593 (Fla. 3d Dist.
Ct. App. 1985).
29. Rhaney v. Dobbs House, Inc., 415 So. 2d 1277, 1278 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App.
1982).
30. Vida Appliances, Inc. v. Gates, 416 So. 2d 1186, 1189 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct.
App. 1982).
31. Tampa v. Bartley, 413 So. 2d 1280, 1281 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
32. Rhaney, 415 So. 2d at 1278.
33. Id.
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accurate tip reporting through decisions which hold that an injured
worker's unreported tips would be included in the AWW calculation if
there was evidence suggesting the employer knew tips were being re-
ceived but not reported. 4 However, unreported tips would not be in-
cluded in the AWW calculation if the employer had provided a reason-
able reporting system with which the employee had failed to follow. 35
The 1990 amendment codified the notion that gratuities are considered
wages only "to the extent reported to the employer in writing as taxa-
ble income."3"
Perhaps one of the more controversial changes in the 1990 amend-
ment involved the elimination of wages earned in concurrent employ-
ment. Previously, an injured worker having two jobs was entitled to be
compensated on the basis of wages earned at both jobs, assuming that
the injured worker was unable to work at either job following the in-
jury and the concurrent employment was of a type covered under the
Act. 37 Under the new definition, wages now include only those wages
earned on the job where the injury occurred and does not include wages
from concurrent employment. 38 The only exception to this rule is the
concurrent earnings of a volunteer firefighter.39
B. Coverage
The Legislature continued to address and refine the law relative to
the interrelationship between alcohol or drug abuse and injuries in the
work place. In section 440.102(l)(a) of the Florida Statutes, "drug"
was defined as "alcohol, including distilled spirits, wine, malt bever-
ages, and intoxicating liquors; amphetamines; cannabinoids; cocaine;
phencyclidine (PCP); hallucinogens; methaqualone; opiates; barbitu-
rates; benzodiazepines; synthetic narcotics; designer drugs; or a metab-
olite of the substances listed."140 The Act continued to provide that inju-
ries "occasioned primarily by the intoxication of the employee" or the
influence of narcotic drugs, barbiturates, or other stimulants "not pre-
scribed by a physician" that impaired the employee's normal faculties
34. See, e.g., Hanks v. Tom Brantley's Tire Broker, 500 So. 2d 614, 615 (Fla. 1st
Dist. Ct. App. 1986).
35. Id.
36. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990).
37. See FLA. STAT. § 440.02(23) (1989).
38. FLA. STAT. § 440.02(24) (Supp. 1990).
39. Id.
40. FLA. STAT. § 440.102(1)(a) (Supp. 1990).
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were not compensable. 1 It is legally presumed that the injury was pri-
marily occasioned by intoxication given evidence of a .10 percent (or
greater) blood alcohol level or influence of a drug upon a positive test
confirmation.4 Where the employer does not have a drug-free work
place program, the presumption may be rebutted by clear and convinc-
ing evidence that intoxication or drug influence did not contribute to
the injury.4 3 Furthermore, if before the accident, "the employer had
actual knowledge of and expressly acquiesced in the employee's pres-
ence at the workplace while under the influence," the presumption is
inapplicable.
As initially provided in the 1989 law,"" the employer who has
"reason to suspect" that an injury was primarily occasioned by intoxi-
cation or use of any drug may require the employee to submit to a test
for the detection of any or all drugs."" Seeking to provide employers
with some guidance, the legislature defined "[r]easonable suspicion
drug testing" as that based on a belief that the employee has or is
using drugs in violation of the work place policy.46 Such belief is to be
made in light of specific facts and inferences drawn therefrom.47 These
facts and inferences may be based on:
(1) direct observation of drug use or the associated physical symp-
toms; (2) abnormal or erratic behavior or significant work perform-
ance deterioration; (3) report of drug use by reliable and credible
source independently corroborated; (4) evidence of drug test tam-
pering with current employer; (5) information that employee has
caused or contributed to accident; and, (6) evidence that employee
has used, possessed, sold, solicited, or transferred drugs while work-
ing or while on the employer's premises or while operating the em-
ployer's vehicle, machinery or equipment.48
If the employee refuses to submit to a test for nonprescription con-
trolled substances or alcohol, it is presumed, in the absence of clear and
convincing evidence otherwise, that the injury was primarily occasioned
41. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(3) (Supp. 1990).
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(6)(a) (1989).
45. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(7)(a) (Supp. 1990).
46. FLA. STAT. § 440.102(1)(i) (Supp. 1990).
47. Id.
48. Id.
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by alcohol or a nonprescription controlled substance49 and benefits are
not payable.50
The 1989 law provided for a twenty-five percent reduction of in-
demnity benefits where the employee's injury was caused by a "willful"
refusal to use a safety appliance provided by the employer.51 Presuma-
bly in an effort to lessen the employer/carrier's burden of proof to sup-
port this partial defense, the 1990 law substituted the term "knowing"
for willful.52
The 1990 legislation also sought to address the compensability is-
sue in several categories which commonly arise5" and have given impe-
tus to their own sub-body of case law. These cases have usually turned
on the specific facts presented and have produced widely recognized
rules of compensability.
1. Recreational and Social Activities
Injuries by accident occurring at recreational or social activities
are not compensable unless the activity was an expressly required inci-
dent of employment and produced a substantial and direct benefit to
the employer beyond a general improvement in employee health and
morale.5 ' This provision is a codification of a three-prong test previ-
ously adopted by Florida's First District Court of Appeal in Brockman
v. City of Dania.55
2. Going or Coming
The general rule that an injury occurring while going to or coming
from work does not arise out of, and in the course of, employment now
applies even where the employer has provided some means of transpor-
tation.56 This is contrary to previous decisional law providing generally
that employer-provided transportation, incident to the employment con-
tract, is the exception to the going and coming rule.57 However, an em-
49. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(7)(b) (Supp. 1990).
50. See FLA. STAT. 440.09(3) (Supp. 1990).
51. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(4) (1989).
52. FLA. STAT. § 440.09(4) (Supp. 1990).
53. See generally FLA. STAT. § 440.092 (Supp. 1990).
54. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(1) (Supp. 1990).
55. 428 So. 2d 745 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
56. FLA. STAT. § 440.092 (Supp. 1990).
57. See, e.g., Martinez v. A & D Elec. Contractors, 510 So. 2d 1042 (Fla. 1st
450 [Vol. 16
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ployee's injuries which occur going to or coming from work in em-
ployer-provided transportation remain compensable if, at the time of
the accident, the employee was "engaged in a special errand or mission
for the employer."5
3. Deviation from Employment
Injuries occurring while an employee has deviated from the course
of employment, including the leaving of the work premises, are not
compensable unless the deviation was either expressly approved by the
employer or in response to an emergency and designed to save life or
property ."
4. Traveling Employee
In an effort to limit what had become a general rule that injuries
occurring to traveling employees were nearly always compensable, the
new law provides that the traveling employee must be actively engaged
in the employment duties including travel to and from the place where
the duties "are to be performed and other activities reasonably required
by the travel status."" While it remains unclear how "other activities
reasonably required"61 will be interpreted, this amendment was clearly
aimed at cases where traveling employees have sustained what were
held to be compensable injuries in activities seemingly far removed
from the employment and more of a personal nature.
In Gray v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,62 a flight attendant sustained a
broken nose in a pickup basketball game at a YMCA located near the
hotel where the attendent was staying.6 3 The incident occurred on a
two-day layover. 6 ' Citing Larsen's treatise, on workers' compensation
law, the court noted that the "traveling employees" rule was applicable
and stated that:
"Employees whose work entails travel away from the employer's
Dist. Ct. App.), rev. denied, 519 So. 2d 987 (1987).
58. FLA. STAT. § 440.092 (Supp. 1990).
59. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(3) (Supp. 1990).
60. FLA. STAT. § 440.092(4) (Supp. 1990).
61. Id.
62. 475 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
63. Id. at 1289.
64. Id.
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premises are held . . . to be within the course of their employment
continuously during the trip, except when a distinct [departure] on
a personal errand is shown. Thus, injuries arising out of the neces-
sity of sleeping in hotels or eating in restaurants away from home
are usually held compensable." 65
In a two-to-one decision, the appellate court reversed a finding of
noncompensability and held that exercise (in the form of basketball)
was necessary as an activity reasonably required for the employee's
personal health and comfort. 66
In a second case, Garver v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,6 7 again involv-
ing a flight attendant, the employee was injured in a motor vehicle ac-
cident during an extended layover."8 With her morning return flight
canceled and rescheduled for midnight, the employee arranged lunch
with a friend who lived in the area.69 After lunch, they started out for
the friend's house about twenty miles from the restaurant.7 0 After trav-
eling about five miles, the accident occurred.7 1 Announcing a new test
for a traveling employee's injury sustained while not actively perform-
ing employment duties, the appellate court held such injury is compen-
sable "'if the injury arises out of a risk which is reasonably incidental
to the conditions and circumstances of employment.' ",72 Interestingly,
this was also a two-to-one decision. A thoughtful dissent was written by
the same judge who earlier had dissented in Gray.3
C. Medical Services and Supplies
Several of the 1990 changes under the medical provision of the
Act had as their impetus the sometimes truly adversarial nature of the
system. An "[i]ndependent medical examination" was defined as an ob-
jective medical or chiropractic evaluation of an injured employee's
65. Id. (quoting ARTHUR LARSON, WORKMAN'S COMPENSATION § 25.00 (1979)).
66. Id. at 1290.
67. 553 So. 2d 263 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
68. Id. at 264.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Garver, 553 So. 2d at 267 (quoting Cavalcante v. Lockheed Elec. Co., 204
A.2d 621, 624 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1964)).
73. See id. at 268-69 (Nimmons, J., dissenting); Gray, 475 So. 2d 1290 (Nim-
mons, J., dissenting without opinion).
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medical condition and work status.7 4 In apparent response to the ero-
sion of' the employer/carrier's traditional right to authorize medical
care, the new law provides that referrals may not be made by health
care providers to other providers or facilities without prior authoriza-
tion from the carrier or self-insured employer, except in emergency
situations.75
Previously, the employer/carrier's right to seek an independent
medical examination (IME) was grounded in section 440.25(6) of the
Florida Statutes, which provided that the physician conducting such an
examination was to be either designated, or at least approved, by the
judge of compensation claims (JCC).Y The 1990 Act gave the em-
ployer/carrier the right to schedule an IME with a doctor of its own
choice without court approval in the following situations:
(1) [W]hen the authorized doctor fails to provide medical reports;
(2) to determine if overutilization by a health -care provider has
occurred; (3) to determine if a change of doctors is necessary; or,
(4) to determine if treatment is necessary or where the employee
appears not to be making appropriate progress.7
In the absence of agreement between the parties, the doctor conducting
the IME shall not become the treating physician. 8 It should be noted
that some doctors who conduct IMEs refuse to become the treating
physician even where the parties are in agreement.
The new law has also sought to address the procedure to be fol-
lowed where the employer/carrier wishes to deauthorize a previously-
authorized treating physician. 9 Previously, the statute provided that a
carrier was required to seek an order of deauthorization from the
JCC.80 Furthermore, in Cal Kovens Construction v. Lott,81 the First
District Court of Appeal made it clear that once a satisfactory doctor-
patient relationship had been established, the employer/carrier seeking
to deauthorize that doctor must obtain an order approving the
74. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
75. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(a) (Supp. 1990).
76. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(6) (1989).
77. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(b) (Supp. 1990).
78. Id.
79. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(c) (Supp. 1990).
80. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(a) (1989).
81. 473 So. 2d 249 (Fla. Ist Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
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deauthorization and designation of a newly-authorized physician. 2 The
1990 Act provided for peer review83 and utilization review8" whereby
treatment by a medical care provider could be reviewed by a panel of
physicians having the same specialty.88 If it was determined that overu-
tilization had occurred, the medical care provider could be
deauthorized without a judge's order provided alternative medical care
was offered.88 If there is a finding of overutilization, the division of
workers' compensation may order the doctor to show cause why he or
she should not make repayment.87 The law also continued to provide
that a physician was barred from payment under the Act upon three
findings of overutilization. 88
The subject of attendant care also continued to receive the legisla-
ture's attention. Without a doubt, awards of attendant care had be-
come increasingly frequent during the late 1980s. In 1988, the Act had
been amended to provide that nonprofessional attendant or custodial
care provided by a family member was to be reimbursed at the federal
minimum wage if the family member was unemployed.89 If the family
member chose to leave employment in order to provide the attendant/
custodial care, he or she would be paid at a rate equal to his or her
hourly wage at the previous employment which could not exceed the
customary hourly rate for such care in the community.90 "Family
member" was also defined as "spouse, father, mother, brother, sister,
child, grandchild, father-in-law, mother-in-law, aunt or uncle."'"
In 1989, the Act was again amended to limit the compensation of
family members for nonprofessional attendant/custodial care to no
more than twelve hours per day.9 2 In 1990, seeking to further define
the parameters of attendant care reimbursement, the Legislature indi-
cated that both professional and nonprofessional custodial care must be
performed at a physician's direction and control.93 Attendant or custo-
82. Id. at 252-54.
83. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(f) (Supp. 1990).
84. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(i) (Supp. 1990).
85. FLA. STAT. §§ 440.13(1)(f)-(i) (Supp. 1990).
86. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
87. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(d) (Supp. 1990).
88. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(1)(c) (Supp. 1990).
89. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(e)1 (1989).
90. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(e)2 (1989).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(f) (Supp. 1990).
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dial care was defined as care usually rendered by trained professionals
and beyond the scope of household duties. 94 The doctor must state that
the home or custodial care is required because of the compensable acci-
dent and must describe the nature and extent of the duties to be per-
formed with a reasonable degree of particularity. 8 Codifying existing
case law, family members can be reimbursed only for care which goes
beyond the scope of routine household duties normally performed as a
gratuity.96
Another one of the more controversial provisions of the 1990 Act
involved the obligation of the court to order an IME under any of the
following circumstances:
where there is disagreement in opinions of medical providers; where
two providers have determined there is no medical evidence sup-
porting the employee's complaints or the need for further medical
treatment; or, where the providers agree that the employee is able
to work. 97
If one or more of these situations exist, the judge must, within fifteen
days upon the written request of any party, order an IME to be per-
formed by a doctor chosen from a list promulgated by the division of
workers compensation. 8 Under this so-called "Super-Doc" feature of
the statute, the opinion of the independent medical examiner is pre-
sumed correct unless there is clear and convincing evidence otherwise.19
The independent medical examiner's report is to be sent within thirty
days from the order providing for the examination.100 All indemnity
benefits "shall terminate" during any period the employee fails to coop-
erate in performance of the independent medical exam. 101
A final change in the medical service provision of the Act ad-
dressed the expert witness fee charged by health care providers to give
deposition testimony. 02 Typically, most medical evidence is offered at
the merits hearing through deposition. Prior to this amendment, expert
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)3.a (Supp. 1990).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)3.c (Supp. 1990).
101. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(i)3.a (Supp. 1990).
102. See FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(k) (Supp. 1990).
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fees charged by providers ranged from $150 to $500 and occasionally
more. The amendment provides that the expert witness fee cannot ex-
ceed $200.03
Initially, this fee cap created some problems, but as time has
passed, it has become less so. While the legislation had a commendable
purpose of attempting to provide some control and uniformity on medi-
cal expert witness fees, it may have contributed to the undesirable
trend of an increasing number of health care providers refusing to treat
workers' compensation patients as a result of the reimbursement for
their services being reduced according to a maximum fee schedule. The
dwindling availability of medical care providers to treat injured em-
ployees is becoming an increasing problem in everyday practice.
D. Compensation for Disability
1. Permanent Total Disability
In order to establish entitlement to permanent total disability
(PTD) benefits, the employee has the burden to show an inability to
perform even light work on an uninterrupted basis as a result of physi-
cal limitations. A 1990 amendment added a geographical component to
this burden of proof providing that the employee must demonstrate an
inability to do light work which is available within a 100-mile radius of
the injured employee's home.104
2. Temporary Total Disability
The length of time for which temporary total disability (TTD)
benefits may be received was reduced from 350 weeks to 260 weeks. 105
Catastrophic temporary total disability benefits (i.e. the increased ben-
efit for the severely injured) were eliminated for the permanent and
total loss of use of an arm, leg, hand or foot because of organic damage
to the nervous system.'06
3. Permanent Impairment and Wage-Loss Benefits
The legislature provided that a three-member panel and the divi-
103. FLA. STAT. § 440.13(2)(k) (Supp. 1990).
104. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(1)(b) (Supp. 1990).
105. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2)(a) (Supp. 1990).
106. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(2)(b) (Supp. 1990).
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sion were to establish a uniform disability rating guide.1 07 For post-July
1, 1990 injuries, the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry Dis-
ability Schedule is to be used until the new rating guide is developed. 1 8
Retaining the language of the 1989 amendment, an injured worker
with a permanent impairment and one or more work-related physical
restrictions may be entitled to wage-loss benefits." 9
The wage-loss formula was amended to reduce the amount of ben-
efits payable.'10 Additionally, the legislature indicated that wage-loss
forms and job search reports must be filed with the carrier within four-
teen days after the time benefits are due."' Failure to timely file the
forms and job search reports, demonstrating that the employee made a
minimum of five job searches, will result in no payment of benefits for
that respective period of time."'
Also, a significant change in wage-loss entitlement was made.
Prior to July 1, 1990, an injured employee with a permanent impair-
ment and work-related physical restriction could receive wage-loss ben-
efits for up to 525 weeks after reaching maximum medical impair-
ment." ' Under the new law, the length of time for which wage-loss
benefits can be received is tied directly to the impairment rating as-
signed." 4 For example, an employee with a three percent permanent
impairment is eligible for wage-loss benefits for up to twenty-six
weeks."' At the other end of the spectrum, an employee with a perma-
nency of twenty-four percent or greater is entitled to the maximum
length of wage-loss benefits, which is 364 weeks."' In addition to re-
ducing the number of weeks for which wage-loss benefits could be re-
ceived, a number of defenses were also codified."" The right to wage
loss benefits ends if, in a two-year period, there are three occurrences of
the following:
(1) the employee voluntarily terminates employment for reasons
107. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(a)3 (Supp. 1990).
108. Id.
109. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)1 (Supp. 1990).
110. Id.
111. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)2 (Supp. 1990).
112. Id.
113. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.c (1989).
114. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.d (Supp. 1990).
115. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.d.(I) (Supp. 1990).
116. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)4.d.(V) (Supp. 1990).
117. See FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)5 (Supp. 1990).
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unrelated to the injury; (2) refusal of suitable employment within
the employee's ability; (3) termination from employment due to the
employee's own misconduct as statutorily defined; and, (4) the em-
ployee voluntarily limits his or her own income.118
Each of the three occurrences must arise in different bi-weekly peri-
ods.119 Also, with each occurrence, the employee may be disqualified
from receiving workers' compensation benefits for three bi-weekly
periods. 120
The 1990 Act also provided for the termination of wage-loss bene-
fits if the employee is convicted of criminal violations ranging from sec-
ond degree misdemeanors to capital felonies.12 1 "Convicted" is defined
as "adjudication of guilt, a plea of guilty or nolo contendere" or "a jury
verdict of guilty when . . . adjudication is withheld" and probation is
imposed.12 2 Wage-loss benefits are also terminated if the employee is
imprisoned for motor vehicle/uniform traffic control offenses thereby
affecting the ability to perform his usual or other appropriate
employment.12 3
4. Temporary Partial Disability
As with wage-loss benefits, the formula for temporary partial disa-
bility was changed resulting in reduced benefits.12'
5. Fraud
Another major change in the 1990 Act involved the defense of
fraud in the hiring process .12 Theretofore, the landmark case, Martin
v. Carpenter,126 provided a three-prong test which the employer/carrier
had to satisfy in order to defeat compensability: 1) the employee know-
ingly misrepresented the existence of the previous condition; 2) the em-
ployer relied on the misrepresentation thereby hiring the employee; and
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(3)(b)6 (Supp. 1990).
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(4) (Supp. 1990).
125. FLA. STAT. § 440.15(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
126. 132 So. 2d 400 (Fla. 1961).
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3) that such reliance resulted in consequent injury to the employer. 12 7
However, benefits are now payable for an aggravation or accelera-
tion of a preexisting condition unless the employee falsely represents in
writing that he or she was not previously disabled or received compen-
sation because of such previous disability, impairment, anomaly or dis-
ease. 128 Employer reliance on the misrepresentation of a preexisting
condition is no longer required.
E. Death Benefits
In 1989, the Act was amended to eliminate the termination of
death benefits to a deceased employee's spouse who remarries. Pursu-
ant to the 1990 amendment, the spouse who remarries is entitled to a
lump sum payment equal to twenty-six weeks of compensation at the
rate of fifty percent of the average weekly wage.1 29 If such lump sum
causes the $100,000.00 benefits limitation to be exceeded, the spouse
who remarries shall receive the remaining balance.130
F. Claim Procedure
Claims for benefits under the 1990 Act must be dismissed if they
lack the required specificity. 131 The legislative intent is the avoidance of
needless litigation or delay in payment of benefits by requiring claim-
ants to provide sufficiently detailed information to the employer/carrier
so a timely and informed decision on the benefits requested can be
made. However, if the claimant is unrepresented, the division shall pro-
vide the necessary assistance in filing a claim that conforms to the
specificity requirements.132
Emphasizing the role of the division in cases of disputed claims,
the legislature has indicated the division is to take a proactive position
in preventing and resolving disputes.133 If after investigation, the divi-
sion determines that the claimed benefits are due, it shall assist the
employee in securing those benefits.3 4 If the division determines the
127. Id. at 406.
128. FLA. STAT. 440.15(5)(a) (Supp. 1990).
129. FLA. STAT. § 440.16(1)(b)2 (Supp. 1990).
130. Id.
131. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1)(e)4 (Supp. 1990).
132. Id.
133. FLA. STAT. § 440.19(1)(h) (Supp. 1990).
134. [d.
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claimed benefits are not due and owing, the division must inform the
employee accordingly."3 5 The division decision is not res judicata, but
may be considered by the JCC or mediator.13 6
G. Payment of Compensation
Prior to July 1, 1990, lump sum settlements under the Act took
only two forms. The first, under Florida Statutes section 440.20(12)(a)
permitted the employer/carrier's release of liability for all benefits
other than future medical care, training and education. This form of
settlement could only occur where the employee was at least three
months past maximum medical improvement.1 37 The second form of
pre-July 1, 1990 settlement was pursuant to Florida Statutes section
440.20(12)(b). This settlement, commonly referred to as a total lump
sum washout, provided for a full discharge of the employer's liability in
cases where it was denied that a compensable accident or injury had
occurred and a written notice to controvert had been filed.138 Interest-
ingly, this form of settlement since the July 1989 amendment specifi-
cally excluded discharge from training and education expenses.13
There is now a third form of settlement available under limited
circumstances which is a true total washout.1 40 The requirements are
that the employee has: 1) reached MMI; 2) a five percent or less per-
manent impairment rating; and 3) not received medical treatment for
at least three months.141
The amount of settlement is determined by a statutory formula
consisting of the compensation rate multiplied by three producing a
product which is then multiplied by the permanent impairment rat-
ing." 2 This form of settlement mandates that the claimant be responsi-
ble for payment of his or her own attorney's fees and fully discharges
the employer/carrier for all benefits including medical expenses, train-
ing and education. 4 3
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12)(a) (Supp. 1990).
138. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12)(b) (Supp. 1990).
139. Id.
140. FLA. STAT. § 440.20(12)(c) (Supp. 1990).
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id.
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H. Claims Procedure and Hearing Requests
1. Mediation
The 1990 Act retained the provision for mediation, while eliminat-
ing a major objection to the original 1989 legislation involving attorney
participation. In its initial form, neither party could be represented at
the mediation. Now, the employer/carrier may be represented if the
employee has counsel. " '
2. Pre-Trial Hearings
A pre-trial hearing is to be held between thirty and sixty days af-
ter the request for an application for a hearing has been filed. 1"5 All
parties shall be given at least fifteen days notice of the pre-trial hear-
ing. 1" A final hearing is to be set at the pre-trial hearing which allows,
absent consent of the parties otherwise, at least ninety days to conduct
discovery.14 7 Final hearings are to be held within 120 days after the
pre-trial hearing." 8
I. Attorney's Fees
In determining a reasonable attorney's fee, the JCC is to consider
only benefits the attorney was responsible for securing when applying
the statutory formula. 49 Under the 1990 Act, the term "benefits se-
cured" does not include future medical benefits provided beyond five
years after the date the claim was filed.1 50 This obviously has the po-
tential to limit the amount of attorney's fees awarded in connection
with successful prosecution of a claim for medical benefits for which
the evidence supports the need for lifetime medical care.
J. Self-Insurers
An extensive provision was included in the 1990 Act relative to
144. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(b)1 (Supp. 1990).
145. FLA. STAT. § 440.25(3)(b)3 (Supp. 1990).
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. FLA. STAT. § 440.34(2) (Supp. 1990).
150. Id.
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employers seeking to be self-insured for workers' compensation pur-
poses.16' The employer may be required to post an indemnity bond or
securities to procure payment of compensation. A company seeking
to be self-insured must have trained personnel who can ensure that
benefits are provided and a safe working place available.6 3 The self-
insured employer must also carry reinsurance for actuarial stability.'6 '
If the employer fails to maintain the required financial security, the
authority to self-insure shall be revoked unless a certified opinion of an
independent actuary estimating future compensation benefits is pro-
vided and a security deposit is made. " Failure to do so will result in
revocation of the employer's authorization to self-insure. 56 At that
point, the employer must provide a certified actuarial opinion regarding
estimated future compensation payments for claims incurred while self-
insured and post a security deposit equal thereto. 157 Such actuarial
opinions are to be provided at six month intervals until such time as the
claims incurred have no remaining value.6 8 Failure to provide reports
or security deposit gives rise to a cause of action in circuit court against
the employer by the Florida Self-Insured Guarantee Association to re-
cover a judgment equal to the present value of estimated future com-
pensation payments and attorney's fees."'
The new Act also provides a third alternative to a company
purchasing traditional workers' compensation coverage or becoming
self-insured. The employer can obtain a twenty-four hour health policy
which provides medical benefits and an insurance policy which provides
the indemnity benefits required by the Act. 6
K. Penalty for Failing to Secure Compensation
An employer failing to have workers' compensation coverage is
guilty of a second degree misdemeanor and may be enjoined from em-
ploying individuals and doing business until payment for compensation
151. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b)1 (Supp. 1990).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b)2 (Supp. 1990).
156. Id.
157. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(b)3 (Supp. 1990).
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. FLA. STAT. § 440.38(1)(e) (Supp. 1990).
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is secured. 161 If upon being provided written notice, the employer fails
to show evidence of workers' compensation coverage, a $500.00 penalty
shall be assessed.102 If coverage is not obtained within the next ninety-
six hours, a daily penalty of $100.00 will be assessed until the employer
complies.'63
L. Special Disability Trust Fund
The schedule of preexisting physical conditions giving rise to a
conclusive presumption that the employer considered the condition to
be permanent or likely to be a hinderance or obstacle to employment
was amended to add obesity. 6 To qualify under the provision, the em-
ployee had to be thirty percent or more over the average weight desig-
nated for that employee's height and age. 6 '
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE
In Scanlon v. Martinez,'66 the plaintiffs filed an action for declara-
tory and injunctive relief seeking a determination as to the validity of
portions of chapter 89-289 and chapter 90-201 of the Laws of Florida.
The plaintiffs consisted of a group of individuals as well as some labor
organizations. 6 ' It was the plaintiffs' position that sections of the Com-
prehensive Economic Development Act of 1990 violated certain consti-
tutional provisions, including due process, separation of powers and the
single subject rule under the Florida Constitution.' 68
The Circuit Court of Leon County held that chapter 90-201 of the
Laws of Florida did, in fact, violate the single subject rule contained in
the Florida Constitution. 69 The court found that the subject matter of
161. FLA. STAT. § 440.43 (Supp. 1990).
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. FLA. STAT. § 440.49(2)(f1.x (Supp. 1990).
165. Id.
166. 44 Fla. Supp. 2d 170 (Fla. 2d Cir. Ct. 1990).
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 171. FLA. CONST. art. III, § 6 provides:
Every Law shall embrace but one subject and matter properly connected
therewith, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in the title. No law
shall be revised or amended by reference to its title only. Laws to revise or
amend shall set out in full the revised or amended act, section subsection,
or paragraph of a subsection. The enacting clause of every Florida law
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the Act, the economic growth and development of Florida, was too
broad and that the disparate topics were not reasonably and rationally
related to the subject of the bill. 17 0 Chapter 90-201 was, therefore, held
to be constitutionally invalid in its entirety.17 1
The circuit court then addressed the alleged separation of powers
violation under the Florida Constitution.1 72 It analyzed the section of
chapter 90-201 which created the Industrial Relations Commission
within the executive branch. While an executive branch entity, the new
law provided that the IRC judges were subject to Supreme Court Judi-
cial Nominating Commission appointment and retention.1 7 Further,
the law provided that the governor must reappoint any IRC judge who
received a favorable report from the Judicial Nominating Commis-
sion. '7 The circuit court held that the retention provision, together
with the fact that the IRC judges were subject to disciplinary proceed-
ings by the JNC, violated the separation of powers rule and therefore,
chapter 90-201 was invalid in its entirety for this reason as well.' 75
In addition to finding the entire Act constitutionally invalid, the
circuit court also addressed several specific provisions. It found that the
"Super-Doc" provision lacked a rational basis in providing that the
opinion of the court-appointed doctor should carry greater credibility
that the opinions of other doctors.' 76 The court also found that this
provision usurped the fact-finding responsibility of the JCC and con-
cluded that this section violated both the due process and access to
courts guarantees. 77
The circuit court also held that chapter twenty of the Act, provid-
ing that the employee seeking permanent total disability benefits must
show that he or she is unable to do even light work available within a
100 mile radius of home, violated the access to courts guarantee of the
Florida Constitution because it was not a reasonable alternative to
common law rights otherwise available.' 78 Constitutional deficiencies
were also found in chapter twenty of the Act amending the wage loss
shall read: "Be It Enacted by the Legislature of the State of Florida".
170. Scanlon, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d at 171.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 171.
175. Scanlon, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d at 172.
176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 173.
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provision by providing for a shifting burden of proof based on the
amount of permanency.' The circuit court likewise found that the
sunset provisions of chapter 89-289 and backward repealer provision of
chapter 90-201 were an invalid attempt by the legislature to sunset
general laws.' 80 The circuit court did rule that constitutional frailties of
the individual provisions outlined above were, however, severable and
therefore declined to declare the entire Act unconstitutional on that
basis. 8' The circuit court held that the sunset provision of chapter 89-
289 and all of chapter 90-201 of the Laws of Florida were invalid.' 82
Following the Leon County Circuit Court announcement of its
opinion on December 5, 1990, the legislature met in a special session in
order to address the objections enunciated to the new legislation. Out
of this special session emerged two different bills which served to sepa-
rate the workers' compensation provisions 8 ' from the international af-
fairs and trade subject matter. 8' Both bills essentially readopted the
provisions initially contained in chapter 90-201 and with minor excep-
tion, provided for retroactive application to July 1, 1990. The legisla-
ture also passed chapter 91-2, House Bill 1 I-b, which provided for the
repeal of Florida Statutes section 20.171(5) (chapter 90-201 of the
Laws of Florida), which had created the Industrial Relations Commis-
sion, and section four, chapter 90-201 of the Laws of Florida, relating
to IRC rules of adoption by the Florida Supreme Court. This bill also
provided for the repeal of section 440.4415 regarding creation of the
Workers' Compensation Oversight Board and legal counsel.
In addition to the above provisions, chapter 91-2 of the Laws of
Florida, House Bill 11-b, also amended the Act relative to the con-
struction industry. The definition of "employee" was amended to per-
mit no more than three officers of a corporation involved in the con-
struction industry to make an election of exemption from the Act by
filing written notice pursuant to Florida Statutes section 440.05. It also
provided that partners or sole proprietors in the construction industry
are considered employees unless they elect to be excluded and file writ-
ten notice. As with corporations in the construction industry, no more
than three partners in a partnership actively involved in the construc-
179. Id.
180. Scanlon, 44 Fla. Supp. 2d at 173.
181. Id. at 174.
182. Id. at 175.
183. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-1 (West).
184. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-5 (West).
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tion industry may elect to be excluded from the Act.
Chapter 91-2 also amended section 440.05 regarding the notice of
waiver of exemption as it applies to every sole proprietor, partner or
corporate officer actively engaged in the construction industry.185 Upon
receipt of a proper written notice, the division must issue a certificate
of the election to the party so making it. A copy of the election certifi-
cate is to be sent to the workers' compensation carrier that is otherwise
providing coverage for the sole proprietorship, partnership or corpora-
tion. The election certificate remains valid for two years or until the
election is revoked, whichever occurs first. Additionally, any contractor
responsible for compensation under section 440.10 can register with
any subcontractor's carrier thereby being entitled to receive written no-
tice of any cancellation or non-renewal of coverage. Further, the con-
tractor may require any subcontractor to provide evidence of workers'
compensation coverage or a copy of the subcontractor's certificate of
election. Any subcontractor who has elected to be exempt from the Act
must provide a copy of the election certificate to the contractor. If the
contractor or third party payor becomes liable for payment of compen-
sation to an employee of a subcontractor who has made an invalid elec-
tion to be exempt, the contractor or third party payor may recover
from the sole proprietorship, partnership or corporation all benefits
paid or payable, plus interest, unless the contractor and subcontractor
had a written agreement that coverage was to be provided by the
contractor.186
Following the 1991 special legislative session, during which the
above amendments were passed, the Florida Supreme Court, in a
deeply divided opinion, announced its decision in Martinez v. Scan-
Ion. 87 This decision had been received by way of certification from the
First District Court of Appeal as a case of great public importance.188
This list of parties to the action and non-parties submitting amicus cu-
riae briefs reads like a list of who's who in the business and labor
world.189
185. 1991 Fla. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 91-2 (West).
186. Id.
187. 582 So. 2d 1167 (Fla. 1991).
188. Id.
189. Id. The list included Associated Industries of Florida, the Florida Chamber
of Commerce, National Counsel on Compensation Insurance, Employers Insurance of
Wausau, Tampa Bay Area NFL, Inc., South Florida Sports Corporation, Professional
Firefighters of Florida, Inc., the AFL-CIO and IBEW, Communication Workers' of
America, Florida Police Benevolent Association, Florida Construction, Commerce and
[Vol. 16466
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 16, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 14
https://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol16/iss1/14
Robinson
Turning to the trial court opinion, the supreme court noted that
the plaintiffs alleged in the declaratory action that they were taxpayers,
employers, employees or labor organizations who were interested in and
had doubt as to their rights under the 1989 and 1990 amendments. 190
The defendants argued that the plaintiffs lacked the requisite standing
to bring suit, that some of the claims were either premature or moot
and that the amendments were constitutional.19'
Reviewing the declaratory judgment statute,' 92 the court noted
that an individual may seek declaratory relief only where it can be
shown tlhere exists a bona fide, actual present need for the declara-
tion. 198 The court's majority stated it had serious reservations that the
action was properly the subject of the declaratory judgment act. 9 " It
noted the parties had given little or no mention to this procedural issue.
However, while cautioning trial courts to exercise their discretion in
such cases involving constitutional challenges, the court declined to dis-
miss the action itself.19
Citing case law, the court rejected the argument that the provi-
sions of the 1990 law, with the substantial reduction in benefits, vio-
lated the, constitutional right of access to courts.' 96 While acknowledg-
ing the reduction in benefits, the court found the law to be a reasonable
alternative to tort litigation noting that full medical care and wage loss
benefits, regardless of fault, continued to be available without delay
and uncertainty. 97 It also noted that in situations which were previ-
ously compensable, but no longer so because of the amendment, em-
ployees were still free to prosecute their claims in tort. 98
The court next addressed the constitutional challenge for violation
of the single subject requirement. It agreed with the lower court that
Industry Self-Insurer's Fund, Florida Association of Self-Insurers, Florida Group Risk
Administrators Association, Inc., Academy of Florida Trial Lawyers, Florida Chamber
of Commerce Self-Insurance Fund, Employers Association of Florida, Florida Fruit
and Vegetable Association Self-Insurer's Fund, Lee County Electrical Cooperative and
Harper Brothers, Inc. Self-Insured Employers. Id.
190. Id. at 1169-70.
191. Id. at 1170.
192. FLA. STAT. § 86 (Supp. 1990).
193. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1170.
194. Id. at 1171.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 1171-72.
198. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1172.
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chapter 90-201 violated this principle and was therefore unconstitu-
tional.199 However, the State of Florida argued that this constitutional
problem had been cured by virtue of the January 1991 special session
which separated chapter 90-201 into distinct bills, one addressing inter-
national trade and the other workers' compensation."° While acknowl-
edging merit in the state's argument, the court noted that it was being
asked to scrutinize the constitutionality of a statute that was no longer
in existence. 10' Noting that the 1991 Act was not before it, the court
indicated that if it were subsequently found unconstitutional as a result
of the reenacted provisions, the validity of the 1990 Act would still be
in question.2 0 2 While suggesting that it could remand the case back to
the trial court for reconsideration in the light of the 1991 amendments,
the court chose to retain jurisdiction in the interest of judicial
economy. 0
The court found that the separation of powers violation had been
resolved by the 1991 Act and the issue was therefore moot.2 0 However,
it also stated that the trial court erred when finding the entire Act un-
constitutional as a result of the separation of powers violation. The
court found that the IRC provisions and creation of the Workers' Com-
pensation Oversight Board were severable and even if unconstitutional,
would not render the entire Act invalid 05 Further, the trial court
should not have considered these provisions under the Declaratory
Judgment Act because the plaintiffs were unable to show their rights
were affected by them.20 6
As with the separation of powers argument, the court also noted
that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate their rights were actually af-
fected by the individual provisions of the 1989 and 1990 Acts which
were attacked on various other constitutional grounds.2 7 Since the
plaintiffs could show only that their rights might be affected in the fu-
ture by these provisions, they were not properly the subject of a declar-
atory judgment action. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that chap-
ter 90-201 was unconstitutional for violation of the single subject rule
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 1172-73.
202. Id. at 1173.
203. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1173 n.5.
204. Id. at 1173.
205. Id.
206. Id. at 1174.
207. Id.
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was affirmed, as was its holding that the 1990 law did not violate any
constitutional access to courts provision. The remainder of the trial
court's holding was reversed.20 8
The Florida Supreme Court then addressed the issue as to what
effective date should apply to its ruling. Previous case law suggested
that whether or not a statute was void ab initio depended on whether
the legislative body passing the law had the power or authority to do
so. Here, the issue was not one of the legislature's constitutional au-
thority to pass chapter 90-201, but rather the form of the law itself.2"9
The supreme court pointed to previous opinions, both its own210 and
those of the United States Supreme Court "1' where statutes had been
declared unconstitutional, but the decisions were given prospective ef-
fect only.212 The rationale common to these decisions involve equitable
principles and the avoidance of injustice or hardship resulting from a
retroactive application. 213 The legislature's declaration that the 1991
curative statutes were to be given application retroactively to the effec-
tive date of the 1990 Act was cited by the court. While refusing to rule
on these retroactive provisions of the 1991 Act, the court concluded
that its holding of chapter 90-201 as unconstitutional in its entirety was
prospective only.2" 4
In his concurring opinion, Justice Kogan agreed that the 1990
statute was unconstitutional for violation of the single subject rule.2"'
He found all other issues raised therefore moot, noting that the court
later address the constitutionality of the 1991 Act, if challenged.
In an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice
Barkett (joined by Chief Justice Shaw and Justice Kogan) agreed that
the 1990 Act violated the single subject rule and therefore other issues
raised were premature. 216 However, Justice Barkett dissented to the ex-
tent that the majority opinion was to be given prospective application
only. While acknowledging existence of legal precedent supporting pro-
spective application, Justice Barkett's disagreement with these deci-
208. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1174.
209. Id.
210. See, e.g., Interlachen Lakes Estates, Inc. v. Snyder, 304 So. 2d 433 (Fla.
1973).
211. See, e.g., Ciprano v. Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969).
212. Martinez, 582 So. 2d at 1175.
213. 1d.
214. Id. at 1175-76.
215. Id. at 1176 (Kogan, J., specially concurring).
216. Id. (Barkett, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
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sions was evident. In her view, a statute declared facially unconstitu-
tional is null and void from its inception.
IV. CONCLUSION
While it is now clear that the Comprehensive Economic Develop-
ment Act of 1990, chapter 90-201, has been declared unconstitutional,
there remain many questions as to what direction the workers' compen-
sation law of this state will take in the foreseeable future. Certainly, as
Justice Kogan suggested in his concurring opinion, the door remains
open for a separate constitutional challenge to the 1991 statute. How-
ever, as a result of the curative 1991 legislation which addressed the
constitutional objections to the 1990 Act, it is perhaps more likely that
further constitutional challenges will be more narrow, focusing on spe-
cific provisions of the 1991 Act as amended.
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